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The instant Symposium, to which we are delighted to contribute this 
article, marks the 50th anniversary of the contemporary class action.  It 
also provides a uniquely apt occasion for sharing an insight that we have 
come to over the past decade-plus of conducting and writing about large 
and potentially transformative class cases seeking injunctive relief.  The 
insight is this: neither Rule 23 nor its judicial gloss provides coherent 
principles for determining when and to what extent an injunctive class 
action may sacrifice the interests of some class members in favor of a 
greater good. 
One often reads that, “because of the group nature of the harm 
alleged and the broad character of the relief sought,” Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes are necessarily “homogenous and cohesive group[s] with few 
conflicting interests.”1  But that truism is debatable; at minimum, it begs 
the question of what counts as a “conflicting interest.”  As we have 
observed elsewhere, “significant injunctive-relief class actions will 
almost always feature some measure of heterogeneity in the goals and 
agendas of the constituent class members.”2  How should we account for 
these divergent interests?  Fifty years on, no coherent theory gives us a 
basis for making these judgments in injunctive class actions. 
And we sorely need a theory.  Class members often have conflicting 
positions with respect to the outcome of litigation—especially in 
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 1.   Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998); see also David 
Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class 
Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 664 (2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Flawed] (“The fact that a 23(b)(2) 
class is an actual group that exists in the real world, not some assemblage cobbled together for the 
sake of expediency, motivates this presumption of cohesion.”). 
 2.   Myriam Gilles, Can John Coffee Rescue the Private Attorney General? Lessons from the 
Credit Card Wars, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2016); Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 664 
(“Conflicts of interest abound in Rule 23(b)(2) suits.”). 
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complex, structural reform cases of the type that Rule 23(b)(2) addresses, 
and was meant to address.  For example, it may be the case that a 
minority within an injunctive class would prefer to reject the terms of a 
particular consent decree or settlement, while the majority of class 
members support the negotiated relief.  Is this a disabling conflict?  
Should we require total homogeneity of class member interests in order 
to settle the (b)(2) class action and order the injunction?3  If not, what is 
the basis for extinguishing, via a non-opt-out class settlement process, 
the rights of dissenting members to bring suit challenging defendant’s 
conduct as they see fit?4  On the other hand, what level of heterogeneity 
can the (b)(2) class action accommodate?  Should we presume, for 
starters, that a (b)(2) injunctive class can tolerate more than zero 
dissenting class members but less than 50%?  These questions have 
arisen with great urgency in a number of prominent, recent class actions 
and, looking back, it is clear that we have lacked any meaningful answers 
since the inception of the rule. 
It is not just the degree of permissible heterogeneity that we need to 
account for, but the type of class member interests at stake.  Professor 
Bone (another contributor to this Symposium) has suggested that class 
members’ differing “subjective preferences or goals” should not be 
relevant to the determination of whether a (b)(2) class can be 
maintained.5  As he points out, “[e]ven a civil rights class action can 
include class members with different preferences about the scope of 
injunctive relief and different views on the desirability of suing at all.”6  
But how do we determine whether class member objections are based on 
objectively identifiable interests rather than subjective preferences?  Is 
that distinction really coherent?  Aren’t preferences themselves the 
product of objective interests filtered through experience?  If an African-
American mother is opposed to a school busing decree because she 
believes the injunction will undercut efforts to improve the local school, 
is that a mere preference?  Is (b)(2) a license to ignore her interests?  
                                                          
 3.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1012 (observing that “if we insist on a truly unitary set of 
preferences and agendas” among class members, we render (b)(2) class actions uncertifiable).  
 4.   Id. at 1011–12 (raising the concern that ignoring conflicts among class members allows 
“[s]ettlement terms [to] reflect the preferences of the majority, while releases will snuff out the 
ability of the minority to pursue its preferred resolutions through litigation”). 
 5.   Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 707 
(2014). 
 6.   Id.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch likewise observes that (b)(2) “plaintiffs’ opinions about 
risk, relief, and strategy may differ vastly even though plaintiffs share a similar trait before suing.”  
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community and the Line In Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 
889, 893 (2010). 
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What if this mom is employed by the local school—does her interest 
graduate from mere preference to objectively identifiable interest? 
The accommodation of heterogeneous class member interests within 
injunctive class actions raises difficult questions.  And the framers of 
Rule 23 did not supply intellectually satisfying answers.7  Rule 23(b)(2) 
was intended by the framers as a powerful legal tool for effectuating 
racial desegregation in the face of southern intransigence.  But it is a 
misconception that the paradigmatic (b)(2) civil rights cases and their 
pre-1966 forebears comprised homogeneous classes with unitary 
interests.  On the contrary, intra-class conflicts abounded.8  But as 
Professor David Marcus has explained, the nobility of the civil rights 
project led the progressive 1966 framers and a generation of courts to 
sweep those intra-class differences aside in the service of a greater good.9  
We indulge a fiction—a convenient one to the framers of Rule 23—when 
we justify the trans-substantive mandatory class action by reference to a 
“presumption of cohesiveness.”10  That justification runs counter to the 
historical record, which instead points to a benevolent paternalism that 
knowingly ignored divergent class member preferences in the service of 
a greater good. 
The residue of indulging a fiction is fog.  We are left with no 
coherent trans-substantive justification for a radical majoritarian device 
that allows minority interests in litigation to be steamrolled.  The civil 
rights paternalism that accounts for Rule 23(b)(2) ill fits the 
contemporary injunctive class action, where entrepreneurial counsel 
bring mandatory class actions “with increasing frequency in 
employment, antitrust, environmental, [] securities, and other types of 
class litigation.”11  The moral clarity of the civil rights cases moved the 
framers of (b)(2) to sweep the problem of divergent class-member 
preferences under the rug.  But moral clarity is not a workable principle.  
Gestalt judgments as to the greater good are unsatisfying answers to 
sophisticated class members who question why their interests may be 
ignored. 
                                                          
 7.   7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1768, at 389–93 
(3d ed. 2005) (observing that the framers did not address the “difficult” question of the “level of 
antagonism or conflict that should preclude class certification”). 
 8.   See infra text accompanying notes 64–81 (describing intra-class conflicts in school teacher 
assignment and busing cases). 
 9.   See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 661 (“the 1966 authors [of Rule 23(b)(2)] drafted a 
provision that could help judges ignore or bury . . . conflicts” of interest among class members in 
desegregation cases). 
 10.   Id. at 664.  
 11.   HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 62–66 (2003) (citations omitted). 
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Many courts have been dismissive of objections founded on 
heterogeneous class member preferences and interests, relying upon a 
“presumption of cohesiveness” derived from the supposedly friction-free 
civil rights cases.  Other courts have refused to certify classes in the face 
of conflicting class member preferences, balking at a disunity that they 
suppose—quite wrongly—was absent in the paradigmatic civil rights 
cases that spawned Rule 23(b)(2).12  But either way—whether they are 
pointing to the desegregation cases to justify a presumption of class 
member harmony supporting certification, or conversely as hard-to-attain 
ideals of harmony that justify the rejection of (b)(2) classes—courts 
generally appear blinded by the civil rights paradigm.  Reasoned analysis 
is in short supply.  Aphorisms about the nature of “group rights” and the 
“indivisible nature of the injunctive remedy” are abundant.13 
The lack of a principled framework for addressing heterogeneous 
class member preferences in the context of a mandatory class settlement 
under Rule 23(b)(2) has injected chaos into some of the most 
economically significant class actions in U.S. history.  Most prominently, 
in In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust 
Litigation (“MDL 1720”),14 the Second Circuit in June 2016 overturned 
an antitrust class action settlement that would have reformed credit card 
industry rules and delivered a record $7.2 billion to merchant class 
members.  Objecting merchants—large retailers accounting for roughly 
20% of U.S. transaction volume—argued that the requisite cohesiveness 
was lacking to certify a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2) because, 
they alleged, the injunctive deal foreclosed their ability to seek different 
and preferable injunctive relief terms.15  The proponents of the settlement 
countered that the injunctive rules changes would necessarily affect all 
class members, arguing that the only thing “required to proceed as a 
(b)(2) class is that ‘the relief sought must perforce affect the entire 
class.’”16 
                                                          
 12.   See infra text accompanying notes 98–101 (reviewing decisions relying on cohesiveness 
inquiry to both grant and deny class certification). 
 13.   See id. 
 14.   In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied __ S.Ct. __, 2017 WL 1115037 (Mem) (March 27, 2017).  
 15.   Joint Page-Proof Brief for Objectors-Appellants and Plaintiffs-Appellants (Merchants 
Appellants’ Joint Brief) at 48, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 
827 F.3d 223, (June 16, 2014). 
 16.   Page-Proof Briefs for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 28, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & 
Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223 (Oct. 15, 2014) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011)). 
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Faced with this fundamental dispute regarding the extent to which 
Rule 23(b)(2) may accommodate heterogeneous class member interests, 
the Second Circuit punted.  The appellate panel rejected the settlement 
on the grounds that merchants who would have no interest in damages 
for past harms—principally, merchants who do not yet exist—were 
inadequately represented by class counsel who negotiated both the 
damages settlement and the injunctive terms.17  Only separate counsel for 
the injunctive class, as distinct from the damages class, could ensure 
procedural fairness to merchants who are interested in injunctive relief 
but not damages, according to the Second Circuit’s ruling.18 
The Second Circuit’s myopic focus on the relatively trivial issue of 
future merchants appears designed to shoehorn the case into the 
comfortable parameters of Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor19 and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.20 rather than grapple with the difficult issues posed by 
conflicting class member preferences.  Still, one supposes, a renewed 
settlement will soon enough spawn all the same arguments from the large 
objectors that their interests are being steamrolled by a mandatory class.  
And at that point, the MDL 1720 court will presumably confront 
headlong the legal fog that has shrouded Rule 23(b)(2) since its 1966 
inception.  Perhaps it will address the question of just when, if ever, the 
disunity of class member preferences might exceed what Rule 23(b)(2) 
can bear.21 
In prior work, we have previously described the “tyranny paradox.”22  
Where courts allow a broad heterogeneity of preferences to exist within a 
mandatory class, objectors will complain of a tyranny of the majority.23  
But where a court tolerates relatively less heterogeneity, insisting upon a 
unity of class member interests, it sanctions a tyranny of the minority 
where “a holdout, gadfly, or other outlier can deprive all class members 
of important relief to which they are entitled, and that they would be 
unable to obtain in the absence of the class device.”24 
                                                          
 17.   Merchant Discount, 827 F.3d at 231–34. 
 18.   Id. at 234. (“Unitary representation of separate classes that claim distinct, competing, and 
conflicting relief create unacceptable incentives for counsel to trade benefits to one class for benefits 
to the other in order somehow to reach a settlement.”). 
 19.   521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 20.   527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 21.   827 F.3d at 234 (“We do not decide whether providing [(b)(2)] class members with opt-out 
rights would be a sufficient ‘structural assurance of fair and adequate representation’ . . . to 
overcome the lack of separate class counsel and representative.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 22.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1011. 
 23.   Id. at 1011–13. 
 24.   Id. at 1012. 
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There are no simple answers to the tyranny paradox.  Distinguishing 
between the “mere preferences” of dissenting class members, on the one 
hand, and positions located in “objective” or “structural” member 
attributes only gets us so far.  To be sure, there are cases where class 
member interests are clearly structural and potentially antithetical to the 
interests of class counsel, and those cases are tidily addressed under 
current adequacy of representation doctrine.  But once the structural 
conflicts are accounted for, what then?  How should we deal with 
conflicting class member preferences? 
One answer, in theory, would be to alter the rule.  But whether there 
is a compelling case for reform poses a question for a different day.  Any 
such letter to the Advisory Committee is beyond the scope of this modest 
essay. 
If instead the question is how courts should deal with heterogeneity 
of class member preferences, we believe the answer is rooted in the text 
and history of Rule 23.  As a matter of positive law—of describing what 
the law is—Rule 23 does take a side on the tyranny paradox.  It sides 
with the tyranny of the majority.  Neither the adequacy of representation 
requirement of (a)(4) nor the judicially grafted “cohesiveness” 
requirement provides a check on the radical majoritarianism that is coded 
into the DNA of Rule 23.  Of course, there are potential checks against 
majoritarian overreach, including the fairness requirement of Rule 
23(e)(2), or permitting limited injunctive opt-out rights that would not 
destroy the efficacy of the class relief, but may provide a valve that 
releases the pressure of the competing tyrannies.  This brief essay does 
not purport to propose a definitive framework for answering the difficult 
questions posed by the radical majoritarianism of Rule 23(b)(2).  Our 
goal, rather, is to promote a serious examination of mandatory class 
actions in contemporary practice. 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF RULE 23(B)(2) 
As framed in 1966, the new Rule 23 has been most celebrated for its 
invention of the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action—a heady innovation 
that was carefully designed to preserve individual autonomy and 
property rights in the face of collectivization, principally by providing 
notice and opt-out rights in section (c)(2)(B).25  But the opt-out damages 
                                                          
 25.   See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 
1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 595–97 (2013); Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 
DUKE L.J. 843, 861 (2016) (describing the design of Rule 23(b)(3) as “a new category deliberately 
created”). 
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class was only part of the story.  The new rule also built upon existing 
equity practice allowing for class cases seeking injunctive or declaratory 
relief, in sections 23(b)(2) and (c)(2)(A).26 
If the brand new procedures of Rule 23(b)(3) were the product of 
cool intellectual calculation, the newly framed Rule 23(b)(2) came from 
the heart.  The 1966 framers—progressive-minded lawyers, scholars, and 
judges, for the most part—conceived (b)(2) as a potent tool for 
combating segregation.  Nothing was more pressing to these men than 
cementing the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief 
aimed at desegregating institutions and dismantling Jim Crow policies 
across the South.27  As Professor David Marcus has shown, it is difficult 
to overstate the extent to which desegregation cases were on the minds of 
the framers in crafting (b)(2).28  In fact, the abundant record of 
contemporaneous correspondence surrounding the drafting of Rule 23 
apparently contains no evidence at all that any consideration was given 
to how Rule 23(b)(2) would function outside of the desegregation 
context.29  And the evidence suggests the framers believed that, inside 
the desegregation context, substantial departure from traditional doctrinal 
principles was justified to achieve the ends of social justice. 
The traditional rule in equity, and the practice under the 1938 rules 
of procedure, was that a “true” class action would be entitled to res 
judicata effect only if the interests and preferences of the class members 
were perfectly harmonious.30  As Marcus explains, the rule “prohibited 
                                                          
 26.   See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §1751, at 
10–17 (3d ed. 2005) (tracing history of the class action from its roots in the Bill of Peace created by 
the English Court of Chancery to the promulgation of Equity Rule 48, and finally, the adoption of 
Rule 23); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION (1987). 
 27.   See Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (observing that Rule 23(b)(2) 
“reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial discrimination”); see also Marcus, 
Flawed, supra note 1, at 661 (“Rule 23(b)(2)’s champions ardently supported litigation-driven 
integration, and they believed class treatment of equal protection claims essential to its success.”). 
 28.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 703 n.269 (reporting that Kaplan’s short-hand for (b)(2) 
class suits was “the segregation cases,” and that other members of the committee referred to this 
provision as “the integration section”). 
 29.   According to committee member John Frank, “the race relations echo of that decade was 
always in the committee room. If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the committee, the 
energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class 
action system which could deal with civil rights, and explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule 
which was never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the spirit of the times, we might 
well have had no rule at all.”  John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on 
Class Actions, in 2 Working Papers Of The Advisory Committee On Civil Rules On Proposed 
Amendments To Rule 23 266 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 1997). 
 30.   Bone, supra note 5, at 665 (“[T]he representative suit in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries—which was the predecessor of the modern class action—bound class members to the 
 
996 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
class suits that might produce binding judgments to go forward anytime 
class members might have conflicting preferences for what to do with 
their rights to sue, provided that these preferences were legally 
relevant.”31  Professor Bone’s work provides numerous examples of 
representative suits from the 1930’s and 40’s in which courts determined 
that individual substantive rights had merged “into a unitary right that 
attached to the class as a whole.”32  By the 1950’s, a clear line of cases 
prevented class litigation whenever conflicts of interest among class 
members was even “conceivable.”33 
The early civil rights cases had little trouble negotiating this 
procedural terrain.  Typically, in the period preceding Brown v. Board of 
Education, these cases sought edicts that a particular institution abolish a 
specific discriminatory policy—e.g., the de jure policy of a state law 
school excluding black students.34  The pre-Brown cases did not typically 
                                                          
judgment and precluded future litigation only when the class was strongly unified outside the 
lawsuit.”); Bone, supra note 5, at 669 (describing one of the categories created by the 1938 Rule as 
the “so-called ‘true class action,’” where “the character of the right sought to be enforced for or 
against the class is joint, or common, or secondary”).  See also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM 
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 175 (1987) (observing that strong 
class unity was necessary for any representative suit to have preclusive, binding effect). 
 31.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 671 (observing that federal courts in the early part of the 
20th century “prohibited class suits that might produce binding judgments to go forward anytime 
class members might have conflicting preferences for what to do with their rights to sue, provided 
that these preferences were legally relevant”).  Going back even further, Professor Yeazell has 
demonstrated that “early group litigation involved social groups that were already cohesive entities 
that chose representatives before even appearing in court.”  Ex parte Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Ala., 
Inc. 705 So. 2d 836, 838 n.2 (Ala. 1997) (Hooper, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen C. Yeazell, Group 
Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COL. L. REV. 866, 867, 872, 
877–78 (1977)), overruled by Ex Parte First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. v. First Family Fin. Servs. Inc., 
718 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1998).  See also Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 
62 IND. L. J. 597, 604 n.18 (1987) (providing examples of pure representational cases in equity: 
Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27 (1887); Beatty v. 
Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566 (1829). 
 32.   Bone, supra note 5, at 666.  See also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative 
Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 245–54 and 
75–82 (1990) (providing case examples). 
 33.   Range v. Tenn. Burley Tobacco Growers Ass’n., 298 S.W.2d 545, 551 (1955); see also id. 
(“We think a court of equity should decline to entertain the present action as a class suit for the 
distinctly different reason that complainants are not in the true sense suing in behalf of other 
producers.”). 
 34.   See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), reh’g denied, 305 U.S. 676 
(1939) (concerning a black college graduate challenging the denial of his admission to the University 
of Missouri Law School on equal protection grounds); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 
mandamus denied sub nom., Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948) (same as against University of 
Oklahoma Law School); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, reh’g denied, 340 U.S. 846 (1950) (same 
as against University of Texas Law School).  In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that 
blacks had been denied rights to equal education in violation of the 14th Amendment, and ordered 
schools to provide them these benefits.  Typically, states responded to these decisions by 
establishing short-lived black-only schools rather than integrate existing institutions.  See, e.g., Mary 
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implicate heterogeneous class member preferences, and it is not hard to 
see why.  No black student was forced to apply to law school, after all.  
The original Brown case was in the same mold.  The class plaintiffs 
sought a simple injunction against the operation of a discriminatory 
policy.35  It seemed reasonably safe to assume class member preferences 
in favor of such an order were harmonious. 
But the segregationist backlash to Brown ushered in the complexities 
of the modern era.  As Professor Marcus explains, crafty southern 
legislators sought to neuter Brown by enacting state laws under which 
each pupil was “individually” assigned to a specific school.36  Although 
these “pupil placement” regimes theoretically permitted intrepid 
individual black students to brave otherwise all-white schools on their 
own—by challenging their assignments under an administrative 
procedure and then possibly in court, under Brown—these challenges 
would presumably be rare.37  More importantly, the new regime would 
insulate the school districts from broad class-wide challenges to their 
                                                          
Ann Connell, The Road to United States v. Fordice: What is the Duty of Public Colleges and 
Universities in Former De Jure States to Desegregate?, 62 MISS. L.J. 285, 293–94 (1993) (on 
remand in Sipuel, the Oklahoma Supreme Court “directed university authorities to either admit 
Sipuel to the white law school, open a separate one for her, or suspend the white law school until it 
saw fit to open one for blacks.  Consequently, the Oklahoma Board of Regents quickly assigned 
three white law professors to instruct Sipuel in several roped-off rooms in the state capitol, while it 
hurriedly began to implement steps to establish a law school for black students at Langston.  When 
Sipuel returned to court to complain that the creation of a one-student, overnight special law school 
with totally inadequate facilities was an act of defiance of the Court’s mandate, the Court announced 
that the issue of equality of facilities was not properly before it and upheld the right of the State of 
Oklahoma to create a separate law school for black students.  The new law school at Langston was 
in operation for eighteen months, during which time only one student attended.  After the black 
school closed in 1949, Sipuel was admitted to the University of Oklahoma Law School from which 
she graduated in 1951.”) (internal citations omitted).  Another example is found in cases challenging 
the policies of various school districts’ in paying black teachers less than white teachers for the same 
work.  See, e.g., Alston v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1940) (ordering that 
black teachers be paid on the same scale as white teachers), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940).  Here 
too, a harmonious unity of class member interests can be safely assumed, as all benefited in the same 
basic way from pay raises. 
 35.   Brown, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring “District Courts to take such proceedings and 
enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit 
[black students] to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed”).   
 36.   See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 684. 
 37.   Id.  See also Mark Golub, Remembering Massive Resistance to School Desegregation, 31 
LAW & HIST. REV. 491, 507 (2013) (“Pupil placement laws thus supplied the ostensibly non-racial 
basis upon which conventionally segregated outcomes in school assignments might be preserved. 
Additionally, most placement laws specified administrative remedies for parents of students 
dissatisfied with the school board’s initial decision. The grievance procedures further insulated 
discriminatory treatment from constitutional scrutiny for two reasons. First, drawing out the lengthy 
appeals process meant that it could take years to exhaust local administrative remedies as required to 
gain a hearing in federal courts. Second, making the process sufficiently daunting discouraged 
parents from challenging their school assignments.”). 
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repackaged Jim Crow policies.38  In Briggs v. Elliott, Judge John J. 
Parker, the segregationists’ leading legal light, narrowly interpreted 
Brown to mean only that schools may not discriminate—and not that 
they must affirmatively take steps to integrate.39  Relying on Briggs, 
courts across the South upheld the new pupil placement laws.40  A pupil 
who could show discrimination in her placement, they held, would be 
entitled to relief as to herself alone.  The harm was the discriminatory 
decision made on her placement; it was incurred at the individual level, 
not the group level.  There was, then, clearly no warrant for class relief.41 
Integrationists on the bench and elsewhere grew frustrated as pupil 
placement and similar regimes met with considerable success in 
protecting Jim Crow segregation against court challenge into the early 
1960s.42  Professor Marcus makes the compelling case that, as a 
consequence of this frustration, leading circuit court judges began to read 
Brown in a way they had not before.43  In U.S. v. Jefferson County, Judge 
                                                          
 38.   MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 330 (2004) (“[T]he patent motive behind pupil placement was to 
frustrate desegregation by inviting surreptitious consideration of race by school boards and then 
confounding blacks who were dissatisfied with their placements in a maze of administrative appeals” 
that further demarcated individual rather than group-based resolutions.). 
 39.   Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).  Briggs v. Elliott was one of the 
consolidated component cases of Brown.  On remand after Brown, the Briggs court held that the 
Supreme Court in Brown “has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in the 
schools . . . . [A]ll that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race 
the right to attend any school that it maintains.” Id.  This holding “provided invaluable legal cover to 
recalcitrant southern officials as they fought to maintain Jim Crow after Brown.”  Marcus, Flawed, 
supra note 1, at 683. 
 40.   Golub, supra note 37, at 509 (“On Parker’s interpretation of Brown, the constitutional 
prohibition against segregated schools is satisfied by a transition to facially neutral placement 
criteria or ‘freedom of choice’ plans, even when doing so results in school attendance patterns 
indistinguishable from those under Jim Crow. Racial separation itself need not change, only the 
stated justification for segregation and the techniques by which it is accomplished”). 
 41.   See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 688 (“Individual black students choosing one-by-one 
to attend white schools, however, would never disassemble the segregation edifice”). 
 42.   See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D. Ala. 
1958) (finding pupil placement law constitutionally permissible), aff’d, 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Carson 
v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957) (declining to 
facially invalidate North Carolina pupil placement law); Calhoun v. Members of the Bd. of Educ., 
188 F. Supp. 401, 406 (N.D. Ga. 1959) (same); Beckett v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 181 F. Supp. 
870, 874 (E.D. Va. 1959) (same).  See also Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten 
History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13–14, 13 n. 51 (2016) (observing that “despite 
their openly segregationist purpose, pupil placement laws proved to be remarkably resistant to 
constitutional challenge” and citing cases from the late 1950’s-mid 1960’s in which federal courts 
upheld these regimes against constitutional challenge).  
 43.   Marcus,, Flawed, supra note 1, at 688–90.  See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 
F. Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. La. 1956), aff’d, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957) (A sweeping desegregation 
order issued by Judge Skelly Wright upon New Orleans schools based on an evolving view of 
Brown’s mandate).   
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John Minor Wisdom rejected what he slyly termed the “Briggs dictum” 
that the Constitution does not require integration but merely forbids 
segregation—a conception that, Wisdom complained, made it impossible 
to maintain “class actions suits to desegregate a school system.”44  In the 
wake of this landmark decision, the Fifth Circuit and others began to 
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does demand integration, requiring 
school boards “to achieve integrated schools by mixing groups of black 
and white students together.”45  No longer was the actionable harm of 
discrimination located at the individual pupil level, as under the pupil 
placement regimes.46  Instead, under Jefferson County and other circuit 
cases, courts held the actionable harm under Brown is to the group: 
“Briggs overlooks the fact that Negroes collectively are harmed when the 
state, by law or custom, operates segregated schools,” Judge Wisdom 
wrote.47  “Although the effects of discrimination are felt by each member 
of the group, and discriminatory practice is directed against the group as 
a unit and against individuals only as their connection with the group 
involves the antigroup sanction.  [As] a group-wrong, the mode of 
redress must be group-wide to be adequate.”48 
                                                          
 44.   U.S. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 854 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1966).  Judge Wisdom 
referred to this central precept of the post-Brown jurisprudence as “pure dictum” that had resulted in 
“frustrating effects” on judicial effort to remedy systemic segregation.  Id. at 862.  Judge Wisdom 
wrote that the “Briggs dictum”—which his court and others had restated liberally over the 
intervening years—”may be explained as a facet of the Fourth Circuit’s now abandoned view that 
Fourteenth Amendment rights are exclusively individual rights and in school cases are to be asserted 
individually after each plaintiff has exhausted state administrative remedies.”  Id. at 864.  See also 
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 n.11 (1973) (noting that Briggs’ approach had been 
roundly rejected in earlier decisions). 
 45.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 688.  See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE 
DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE 
SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981). 
 46.   Charles R. Bliss & C. Talley Wells, Applying Lessons from the Evolution of Brown v. 
Board of Education to Olmstead: Moving from Gradualism to Immediate, Effective, and 
Comprehensive Integration, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 705, 714 (2010) (observing that Jefferson 
revealed “the clear recognition that while discrimination was a violation of individual rights, it was 
directed at a group”). 
 47.   Jefferson Cty., 372 F.2d at 866. 
 48.   Id. (quoting Comment, The Class Action Device in Anti-Segregation Cases, 20 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 577 (1953)).  See also Joel Friedman, Desegregating the South: John Minor Wisdom’s Role in 
Enforcing Brown’s Mandate, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2207, 2259 (2004) (observing that Judge Wisdom 
believed that “Brigg’s focus on the individual nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights was 
inconsistent with Brown II’s explicit recognition of the right of blacks as a class to a unitary, 
nonracial system of public education.  By requiring states only to provide relief to discrete 
individuals, the opinion in Briggs permitted, and even encouraged, the perpetuation of a dual, 
segregated system because it failed to address, let alone cure, the systemic constitutional wrong of 
legally mandated educational apartheid”); id.  (“Wisdom insisted, because the evil perpetrated by de 
jure segregation was an injury to an entire race, any meaningful, constitutionally appropriate remedy 
had to address that class-wide wrong.”). 
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The courts’ recognition of an affirmative state duty to achieve 
integration was surely a momentous development in substantive civil 
rights law.49  But it also had a profound, if less obvious, effect on class 
action procedure.  The traditional equity rule requiring homogeneous 
class member preferences had been unproblematic when courts were 
striking down, say, a municipal rule precluding blacks from using certain 
city parks.  But it would be unreasonable to expect unanimity—or 
anything like it—when shuffling the school assignments of all pupils in 
the Fort Worth School District,50 or busing Memphis pupils out of their 
home neighborhoods.51 
Working at the zenith of the civil rights movement, the drafters of 
Rule 23 understood that the percolating flood of integration cases for 
which they designed Rule 23(b)(2) would not satisfy the traditional 
requirement of perfectly harmonious class member preferences.52  But 
they also understood, as Professor Marcus has shown, that “the effective 
vindication of Fourteenth Amendment rights required systemic 
integration, or the treatment of black students as groups regardless of 
their individual preferences.”53  Chief drafter Ben Kaplan thus resisted 
proposals to import from equity the perfect harmony standard for 
                                                          
 49.   Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968).  The Supreme Court applied 
Wisdom’s reasoning in Jefferson County on a nationwide basis, holding that school boards were 
“clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a 
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”  See also Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (demonstrating that the Court continued 
course, stating that it would “correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the 
condition that offends the Constitution”).   
 50.   See, e.g., Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1990) (decades-long desegregation case 
involving the Fort Worth Independent School District which entailed, among other things, 
reassignment of students and faculty, extensive cross-town busing, the implementation of a majority-
to-minority transfer policy, and the building of new magnet schools). 
 51.   See, e.g., Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962).  Memphis 
schools remained deeply segregated into the 1970s, when the district judge finally ordered a new 
plan for cross-town busing of almost 40,000 students—which led to the withdrawal of 29,000 
students from the Memphis school system.  Daniel Kiel, Exploded Dream: Desegregation in the 
Memphis City Schools, 26 L. & INEQUALITY 261, 288 (2008). 
 52.   See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 462 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing 
potential class conflicts in desegregation cases: “it is not impossible that after authorizing action in 
his behalf, a Negro parent, concerned that a continued frontal attack could result in schools closed 
for years, might prefer to wait with his fellows a longer time for good-faith efforts by the local 
school board than is permitted by the centrally determined policy of the NAACP.  Or he might see a 
greater prospect of success through discussions with local school authorities than through the 
litigation deemed necessary by the [NAACP]”); Robert H. Birkby & Walter F. Murphy, Interest 
Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 
TEX. L. REV. 1018, 1037 (1964) (“[F]requently occasions might arise in which the choice between 
an immediate small gain and possible later achievement of a larger aim should at least be put to the 
plaintiff in whose name the suit was being brought, not decided for him by third parties.”). 
 53.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 710. 
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injunctive cases, and he and Wright likewise eschewed any requirement 
that the relief must be indivisible,54 having learned from the pupil 
placement regimes and Briggs just how readily an indivisibility 
requirement could be gamed.55 
Reasonably enough, the framers evidently believed there was no 
satisfactory basis for prescribing the level of disunity among class 
member preferences that a (b)(2) class may accommodate—not without 
jeopardizing the civil rights class cases that were their focus.56  And they 
apparently regarded that the objective sought in those cases was so 
clearly correct, so overwhelmingly important, that steamrolling some 
measure of dissent was a price worth paying.57  In all events, the final 
                                                          
 54.   Committee member John P. Frank expressly proposed to limit mandatory class treatment 
to cases where “the practical effect of the relief granted . . . is to make it impossible or impractical to 
litigate the matter further[]”—i.e., to cases involving a “unitary course of action in which there is no 
divisibility.”  Id. at 700 (alteration in original) (quoting Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank 
to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 9, microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. 
Serv.)).  Kaplan rejected this “indivisibility metric” Marcus has explained, because it would have 
excluded “race relations cases.”  Id. at 700 n. 249. 
 55.   Id. at 706.  Kaplan and Charles Alan Wright were likewise unpersuaded by the suggestion 
of Committee member J.P. Frank to leave (b)(2) out of the rule altogether and instead leave the 
certification of civil rights classes to section (b)(1)(A), on the theory that a defendant would be 
subjected to “incompatible standards” if a court were to hold “that a school should be segregated as 
to one applicant but not as to another.”  Id.  Wright predicted that segregationist courts and 
recalcitrant schools would have a field day with such a doctrine, noting a recent decision where a 
“decree was entered providing the bus company must transport the three named plaintiffs without 
discrimination, but it could . . . refuse all other Negroes.”  See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 706 
(alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Session on Class Actions 13 (Oct. 31, 1963-Nov. 2, 
1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).  
 56.   Id. at 699 (observing that “neither in the extensive memoranda he drafted to lay the legal 
basis for the new rule nor in any other surviving documentation of his efforts did Kaplan explain 
why this intrinsic harmony existed in injunctive relief cases”); id. at 709 (noting that the 1966 
drafters “gave no explanation . . . for why an injunctive relief class judgment could bind absent class 
members with possibly divergent preferences . . .”).   
 57.   Members of the advisory committee were not alone in disregarding potential conflict 
among putative class members.  As Derrick Bell recounts in this emblematic story, leading civil 
rights groups also discounted community preferences that clashed with the goal of full integration:  
I was visited by a small group of parents and leaders of the black community [who] 
needed legal help because the school board had closed the black elementary school in 
their area even though the school had been built during the 1930’s with private funds and 
was maintained, in part, by the efforts of the black community.  Closing of the school 
necessitated busing black children across the county to another black school.  In addition, 
the community had lost the benefit of the school for a meeting place and community 
center.  The group wanted to sue the school board to have their school reopened.  I recall 
informing the group that both LDF and NAACP had abandoned efforts to make separate 
schools equal, but if they wished to desegregate the whole school system, we could 
probably provide legal assistance.  The group recognized as well as I did that there were 
only a few black attorneys in Mississippi who would represent the group, and that those 
attorneys would represent them only if a civil rights organization provided financial 
support.  Sometime later, the group contacted me and indicated they were ready to go 
ahead with a school desegregation suit.  It was filed in 1963, one of the first in the state. 
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text of (b)(2) provided no limiting principle to account for divergent 
class member preferences regarding injunctive remedies.  As written, 
(b)(2) provides only that the challenged conduct of the defendant must 
“apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief. . . is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”58  This text can plainly be 
satisfied in cases where some class members (or even a great many) 
would prefer (or even greatly prefer) to pursue different (or even 
opposed) injunctive strategies, or where dissenting class members would 
prefer to reject proposed settlement terms altogether and preserve 
individual rights to sue. 
In the end, the framers took comfort in the expectation that class 
member dissent inside the civil rights cases would be rare and muted.  In 
fact, when asked whether he could “imagine including in [a Rule 
23(b)(2)] class somebody who specifically objects,” chief drafter Ben 
Kaplan simply answered that he did not “think the cases typically arising 
under [the provision] would present that problem at all.”59  Kaplan and 
his colleagues thus rejected all bids to supply a limiting principle to 
account for divergent member preferences.60 
Of course, all of this history would be of relatively narrow interest 
but for the fact that the framers of Rule 23 were insistent that the new 
rule (b)(2) must provide a trans-substantive rule of civil procedure.  This 
was not obvious or uncontroversial at the time.  Committee member John 
P. Frank, a prominent practitioner, was extremely concerned that the new 
rule marked an unprecedented intrusion on litigant (or class member) 
autonomy.  When Kaplan nixed the idea of extending opt-out rights to 
(b)(2) cases, Frank (who was personally quite liberal and had handled 
important civil rights cases) argued for limiting the reach of (b)(2) to the 
“race relations” cases.61  Needless to say, this proposal went nowhere, 
and the final Advisory Committee notes are explicit that “Subdivision 
(b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases.”62  In the end, Marcus tells us, 
                                                          
  The Leake County incident was unusual at that time because, in most instances, civil 
rights lawyers advised black parents of their rights under Brown in situations where there 
was little or no discussion of alternatives to integration.  . . . My view then was that a 
federal suit designed simply to reopen a segregated black school, even if successful, 
would constitute far less than the full realization of rights to which these parents were 
entitled under Brown.   
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 476 n. 21 (1976). 
 58.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 59.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 698 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 60.   See id.  
 61.   See id. at 703. 
 62.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes. 
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Frank wrote to Kaplan that he had simply “‘subordinate[d] [his] own 
doubts’ as to Rule 23(b)(2) for political reasons, not because he had 
come up with some autonomy rationale for mandatory class treatment.”63  
For Frank and his progressive brethren, the political imperative of 
desegregation demanded that any potential intra-class conflicts be swept 
aside in the service of a greater good. 
II. DISPARATE CLASS-MEMBER PREFERENCES UNDER RULE 23(B)(2) 
In the years following the 1966 inception of Rule 23, courts applied 
(b)(2) to increasingly complex civil rights issues and institutional reform 
cases—and, relatedly, to cases that featured ever greater disunity of class 
member preferences.64  For example, beginning in the late 1960s and 
continuing for decades, courts grappled with class action remedies 
designed to integrate the faculties and staffs of public schools.65  These 
cases generated tremendous difficulties and implicated hugely divergent 
class member interests.66  Many black teachers in historically segregated 
districts were absolutely mortified at the prospect of teaching white 
students.67  Others were put to great hardship in having to travel from 
their home school zones.68  But the injuries wrought by the school 
districts’ discriminatory policies were common to the class in each case, 
and the injunctions affected each class as a whole.  Widely divergent 
class member preferences, then, were no bar to the certification of 
                                                          
 63.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1 at 702 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 64.   As Deborah Rhode notes, “schisms” between class members commonly “surface during 
settlement or remedial deliberations.”  Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 1183, 1188 (1982).  Class members may have been in general agreement about the harm, but 
lack “a shared conviction about the appropriate remedy.”  Id. at 1189.  “However, once it becomes 
clear that some relief will be forthcoming, factions emerge.”  Id. 
 65.   See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (requiring disestablishment of 
continued segregation in faculty assignment).  
 66.   See, e.g., U.S. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, 892 (1966) (“The most difficult 
problem in the desegregation process is the integration of faculties.”); Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 
483, 493 (8th Cir. 1967) (“[T]o eliminate segregation of the faculty . . .  may well be the most 
difficult problem in the desegregation process. . . .”). 
 67.   Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 12–13 n. 48 (2008) 
(“[B]lack teachers . . . wondered too, after years with all-black charges, how well they would teach 
in integrated schools and whether white students and parents would accord them proper respect.”) 
(alterations in original). 
 68.   Id. 
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classes under Rule 23(b)(2)69—no matter how powerfully those 
preferences were expressed.70 
School busing cases presented the same issues.  In 1970’s Boston, 
for example, violent clashes over court-ordered busing plans quickly 
exposed fissures among members of the black community over the goals 
of desegregation litigation.71  Derrick Bell recounted that, while some 
class members remained fully committed to the ideal of “total 
desegregation,” others grew deeply “ambivalent about the busing plans” 
and sought instead to upgrade existing black schools to improve 
educational opportunities and retain minority control.72  Across the 
country—in San Francisco,73 Detroit,74 Atlanta,75 and Dallas76—class-
member opposition to remedial busing plans emerged and grew more 
forceful over time.  And while some civil rights lawyers acknowledged 
these splintering interests, most were fearful (just as the drafters of (b)(2) 
had been) that surrendering to claims of individualized student 
                                                          
 69.   See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 502 (D.D.C. 1967) (“But if any truth is 
axiomatic, it is that the Negro students’ equal protection rights to an integrated faculty cannot be 
undermined or thwarted by the racially induced preferences of the teachers . . .”). 
 70.   Parker, supra note 67, at 15 (discussing massive lay-offs of black teachers as a result of 
Brown); see also Sabrina Hope King, The Limited Presence of African-American Teachers, 63 REV. 
EDUC. RES. 115, 135 (1993) (“[B]etween 1954 and 1965, as an immediate consequence of 
desegregation, 38,000 African-American teachers lost their positions as teachers and administrators 
in 17 states.”). 
 71.   Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 482 (D. Mass 1974), aff’d sub nom. Morgan v. 
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).  See also Matthew 
Delmont, The Lasting Legacy of the Boston Busing Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-boston-busing-crisis-was-never-intended-
to-work/474264/ (detailing violent protests in response to school busing plan).  
 72.   Bell, supra note 57 at 482–89 (describing the varied interests and positions on school 
desegregation and busing within the black community); see also Rhode, supra note 64, at 1189 
(“Constituencies that support integration in principle have disputed its value in particular settings 
where extended bus rides, racial tension, or white flight seem likely concomitants of judicial 
redistricting.  Some minority administrators, teachers, and parental organizations have opposed 
interdistrict remedies that would close minority schools or dilute minority control.”). 
 73.   See id. at 483 n.41 (describing desegregation litigation in San Francisco where the district 
judge observed during a hearing with the parties that “[t]here’s something new that’s coming 
along . . . . There [is] beginning to emerge a demand on the part of large segments of minority 
groups, particularly among the blacks, that they run their own schools and they have black schools”) 
(alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 74.   See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (observing, of 
plaintiffs’ proposed busing plan, that “rigid and inflexible desegregation plans too often neglect to 
treat school children as individuals, instead treating them as pigmented pawns to be shuffled about 
and counted solely to achieve an abstraction called ‘racial mix’”). 
 75.   Bell, supra note 57, at 485 (“[T]he most open confrontation between NAACP views of 
school integration and those of local blacks who favored plans oriented toward improving 
educational quality occurred in Atlanta.”). 
 76.   See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 733 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (addressing minority 
parents’ opposition to busing children below grade four in Dallas desegregation suit). 
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preferences threatened to defeat their “single-minded commitment” to 
integration.77  In Bell’s view, the integration-or-bust mission of the 
prominent civil rights groups “obviate[d] any need to determine whether 
a continued policy of maximum racial balance conform[ed] with the 
wishes of even a minority of the class.”78 
In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,79 emblematic of the era, the Supreme 
Court upheld a plan to integrate Denver area schools by various means, 
including long-distance, cross-town busing.  In dissent, Justice Powell 
fretted that, “[i]n the commendable national concern for alleviating 
public school segregation, courts may have overlooked the fact that the 
rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation program also 
are entitled to consideration.”80  For Justice Powell, missing from the 
Court’s analysis was any consideration of the individualized preferences 
of black students—for example, some wished not to be “on a bus for a 
substantial part of the day,” or expose themselves to the “genuine 
element of danger” of attending a faraway, all-white school.81  Nor did 
the Court reflect upon, in Justice Powell’s view, the desire among some 
black parents that their “children attend community schools near home” 
and receive instruction by black teachers who would serve as models of 
achievement.82 
It is telling that the basis for Justice Powell’s dissent, as well as the 
separate dissent of Justice Rehnquist, had nothing to do with Rule 23—
                                                          
 77.   Bell, supra note 57, at 492 n.64 (quoting NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel Jones: “It 
would be absurd to expect that each and every black person should be polled before a lawsuit is 
filed, or a plan of desegregation is proposed.  Certainly, school boards, who resist these suits, do not 
poll their patrons on their views before shaping a position”). 
 78.   Id. at 492.  Bell continues:  
This position represents an extraordinary view of the lawyer’s role.  Not only does it 
assume a perpetual retainer authorizing a lifelong effort to obtain racially balanced 
schools.  It also fails to reflect any significant change in representational policy from a 
decade ago, when virtually all blacks assumed that integration was the best means of 
achieving a quality education for black children, to the present time, when many black 
parents are disenchanted with the educational results of integration. 
Id.  See also Rhode, supra note 64, at 1211 (discussing civil rights attorneys focus on “maximum 
integration . . . [that] led them to ignore a shift in priorities among many black parents from racial 
balance to quality education”). 
 79.   413 U.S. 189 (1973).   
 80.   Id. at 247 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 
402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971): “[a] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other 
cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The 
task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends 
the Constitution”).  Id. at 239. 
 81.   Id. at 238 n.19 (citing Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of 
Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422, 443 (1972)).   
 82.   Id. at 245. 
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after all, the Rule makes no provision for denying class treatment based 
on heterogeneous preferences.  Instead, the dissenters would have 
restored something akin to the substantive civil rights law doctrine of 
Briggs, rejecting any basis for affirmative decrees mandating particular 
levels of pupil integration (and, in the process, obviating any question of 
divergent class member preferences).83  Most explicit was Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent, channeling Judge Parker’s distinction between 
desegregation and integration: 
To require that a genuinely ‘dual’ system be disestablished, in the sense 
that the assignment of a child to a particular school is not made to 
depend on his race is one thing. To require that school boards 
affirmatively undertake to achieve racial mixing in schools [. . .] is 
quite obviously something else.84 
Throughout, the courts’ unflinching application of Rule 23(b)(2) to 
complex civil rights cases implicating heterogeneous class member 
preferences was faithful to the intent behind the rule.  In drafting (b)(2), 
the framers had eschewed limitations upon the degree of permissible 
disunity in class member preferences.  And so, courts confronting the 
complex civil rights cases of the 1970s and beyond had little trouble 
applying the rule as written.  If the preferences of some teachers, students 
or families got steamrolled by class injunctions in the teacher integration 
and busing cases, that was just the inevitable result of the rule.85 
Over the past several decades, of course, the substantive context of 
Rule 23(b)(2) cases has broadened, moving beyond the initial focus on 
desegregation and into a wider realm of consumer, antitrust, employment 
and other cases.86  In part, this expansion has tracked the spread of legal 
                                                          
 83.   Id. at 250–51 (“There is nothing in the Constitution, its history, or—until recently—in the 
jurisprudence of this Court that mandates the employment of forced transportation of young and 
teenage children to achieve a single interest, as important as that interest may be.”). 
 84.   Id. at 258. 
 85.   Class conflicts were generally ignored in other (b)(2) contexts as well.  See, e.g., Rhode, 
supra note 64, at 1190 (offering examples of “comparable cleaves” among class members in other 
institutional reform contexts, such as cases seeking to enjoin unlawful employment discrimination, 
unconstitutional prison conditions, and discriminatory disability policies).   
 86.   See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3rd 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) (observing that while the (b)(2) 
class may have been “designed specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or 
injunctive relief for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous class of persons” it is now 
employed in a variety of non-civil rights contexts, including consumer, antitrust, employment, and 
toxic harm classes) (quoting NEWBERG AND CONTE § 4.11, at 4–39); see also Linda S. Mullenix, No 
Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 180 (2003) (“[T]he mandatory class in the twenty-first century bears 
only remote resemblance to the archetypal illustrations in the Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note.”). 
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activism outward, from its civil rights core, into other settings.87  But 
equally, in our view, the expansion has been a byproduct of the advent of 
entrepreneurial class action lawyers,88 profit-seeking actors for whom 
injunctive relief and the threat of injunctive relief are useful tools—both 
to lend a sort of social-justice sheen to their actions (and this is not a 
cynical point: the social-justice wrapping of entrepreneurial litigation 
often benefits class members in courts and public opinion) and to lever 
greater monetary compensation for class members and counsel.  Class 
actions in the employment, consumer and antitrust areas routinely feature 
claims for injunctive relief running alongside claims for damages, and 
they routinely settle for substantial damages and insubstantial injunctive 
relief.89 
All these developments—plus the fact that class action settlements, 
nowadays, feature broad and carefully negotiated releases90—put 
pressure on a mandatory class action device that was not built to give 
vent to the interests of dissenting class members.  For one, the sheer 
sprawl of class practice into complex areas, like antitrust cases with the 
potential to reform entire industries, virtually ensured that the 
heterogeneity of class member preferences would be amplified.91  And 
for another, the deployment of the double-barreled injunctive-and-
damages class device in the hands of entrepreneurial lawyers virtually 
ensured greater steamrolling of dissenter interests and preferences.92  The 
steamroller was always there—we saw that in the civil rights cases of the 
1970s, for instance—but now there was a powerful engine attached to it: 
                                                          
 87.   See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 69 (2010) (describing 1970’s rise in litigation brought by issue-oriented 
citizens groups with pro-regulatory agendas, such as environmental, civil rights, and consumer 
protection organizations). 
 88.   See generally JOHN COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: IT’S RISE, FALL AND 
FUTURE (Harvard 2015). 
 89.   See Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 742 (1998) (observing 
that in the last decade “more and more class litigants have attempted to resolve aggregate litigation 
through mandatory, binding settlement classes that incorporate monetary damage claims or release 
monetary damage claims”). 
 90.   See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members 
Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1851–52 (2004) (“It is no secret 
and no sin that the aim of defendants in . . . class actions . . . is ‘global peace,’ an end to litigation on 
the matter,” which is secured by broad releases against future litigation.). 
 91.   See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 2, at 1020–21 (describing proposed injunctive settlements in 
contemporary, complex cases that promise “substantial benefit[s] for a strong majority of class 
members, but that a minority . . . oppose[] on the ground that they could do better for themselves if 
left to pursue their own individual injunctive claims”). 
 92.   See Mullenix, supra note 86, at 217 (“[T]he mandatory nature of the 23(b)(2) part of the 
class could serve as a bar to the pursuit of future claims, which preclusive effect might not be 
ameliorated by the 23(b)(3) presence of an opt-out right.”). 
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the drive to maximize class member compensation (and, of course, 
attorneys’ fees as well). 
But through all these developments, the doctrinal architecture of 
Rule 23(b)(2) has remained unscathed.  The radical majoritarianism that 
lies at the heart of the mandatory class action stands unbent by 50 years 
of practice. 
To be sure, there have been significant doctrinal developments under 
Rule 23(b)(2) over the years, but none that directly implicate the issue of 
warring class member preferences.  Most significant was the rise and fall 
of the so-called “hybrid” class action, where plaintiffs (mostly in 
employment cases) sought to certify classes under (b)(2) for both 
traditional injunctive relief and some “incidental” form of monetary 
relief styled to appear as an equitable remedy—e.g., back-pay under Title 
VII, or restitution or disgorgement.93  Before they were rendered extinct 
by Wal-mart v. Dukes,94 the hybrid cases raised the issue of whether 
(b)(2) might permit opt-out procedures.95  Because the hybrids 
implicated individual claims for money (however those claims might be 
denominated), several pre-Dukes courts held that individual class 
members must, as a matter of due process, have the option to request 
exclusion from the (b)(2) class.96  Importantly, it appears that nearly 
every case approving (b)(2) opt-outs has implicated individual monetary 
interests.97 
The other noteworthy doctrinal development under (b)(2) has been 
the judicial grafting of a “cohesiveness” requirement onto the text of the 
rule.  The cohesiveness requirement imports into (b)(2) the superiority 
and manageability requirements of 23(b)(3)—and arguably 
predominance as well.98  The key point is that the cohesiveness 
                                                          
 93.   See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 (5th Cir. 1998).  See also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
 94.   565 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 95.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1023 (“The pre- Wal-Mart Stores case law is useless here.  To the 
extent that opt-outs have been allowed under Rule 23(b)(2), it has primarily been in the sort of 
‘hybrid’ cases that Wal-Mart Stores abolished.”) (citations omitted). 
 96.   See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he language of 
Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) class actions.”); Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1154–55 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(describing how claims for monetary relief may dissolve the homogeneity that forms the basis of the 
(b)(2) class, necessitating an opportunity for members to opt out).   
 97.   See, e.g., Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 
2012); McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009); Jefferson v. Ingersoll 
Int’l. Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Billington, 110 F.3d at 94; Penson v. Terminal Transp. 
Co., Inc., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); Newsome v. Up-to-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 
364 (D. Md. 2004).  
 98.   See, e.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2010) 
 
2017 RADICAL MAJORITARIANISM 1009 
requirement provides a bulwark against the litigation of individual issues 
in a (b)(2) class.  “Rule 23(b)(2),” in other words, “includes an implicit 
‘cohesiveness’ requirement, which precludes certification when 
individual issues abound.”99  Manageability is the concern.  Here again, 
as with the issue of opt-outs in hybrid cases, the doctrinal development 
does not purport to address the problem of how to treat conflicting class 
member preferences.100 
For the party seeking to argue that its litigation preferences are 
unfairly impinged by a mandatory class action, the cases affirming a 
(b)(2) cohesiveness requirement and the hybrid cases supporting a (b)(2) 
                                                          
(observing that the cohesiveness requirement “imported the (b)(3) predominance requirement into 
the (b)(2) realm”); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) 
(observing that cohesiveness under (b)(2) overlaps significantly with the predominance inquiry 
under (b)(3), as both seek to ensure that “individual reliance questions will not overwhelm the 
questions common to the class”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (holding the 
“predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation”).  See also David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 
GEO. L.J. 777, 788–89 (2016) (observing that some courts have found that “cohesiveness amounted 
to a predominance inquiry,” but observing that, overall, cohesiveness is “a test with no anchor in the 
text of the rule”). 
 99.   See, e.g., Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 544, 557 (D. Minn. 1999).  The 
Third Circuit first established the cohesiveness requirement reasoning that “courts must determine 
whether a proposed (b)(2) class implicates individual issues” because (1) a “suit could become 
unmanageable . . . if significant individual issues were to arise consistently” and (2) “it would be 
unjust to bind absent class members to a negative decision where the class representatives’ claims 
present different individual issues than the claims of the absent members present.”  Barnes v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998),.  See also In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 
1121–22 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Although Rule 23(b)(2) contains no predominance or superiority 
requirements, class claims thereunder still must be cohesive.”); Shook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Cty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A class action may not be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2) if relief specifically tailored to each class member would be necessary to correct the 
allegedly wrongful conduct of the defendant.”) (quoting 5 Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 23.43(2)(b) at 23–
195); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 846 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding class not 
certifiable under (b)(2) because “individual issues overwhelm cohesiveness” and class members are 
“injured by a smorgasbord of day-to-day, case-by-case operational failures . . . as opposed to the 
State’s implementation of any specific policy uniformly affecting—and injuring—each child”); 
M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. Newark Pub. Sch., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114660, at *49–50 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 
2009) (observing “claims to recover compensatory education fail (b)(2)’s cohesiveness requirement” 
where they involve “individual inquiries [that] . . . threaten to overwhelm the action and render it 
unmanageable.”); Donovan, 268 F.R.D. at 11 (observing the cohesiveness requirement “imported the 
(b)(3) predominance requirement into the (b)(2) realm”); Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 
1085 (7th Cir. 2014)  (noting cohesiveness “goes to the efficiency of a class action as an alternative 
to individual suits”); Lightfood v. District of Columbia, 273 F.R.D. 314, 329 n.12 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(clarifying that “absent sufficient cohesiveness, actions would inevitably become so unmanageable 
that the primary purpose of the class action device—i.e., advancing judicial economy and efficiency 
through class-wide treatment—would be destroyed”). 
 100.  Burch, supra note 6, at 982 (2010) (“Because (b)(2) class actions do not require opt-out 
opportunities, assuming cohesion allays judges’ qualms about due-process concerns such as personal 
notice and the ability to exit . . . .  Consequently, [courts] presum[e] that class members’ interests are 
cohesive, even when that presumption is fictitious.”). 
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opt-out right present a sort of fool’s gold: they glitter, but fail to deliver 
any analytic value.  An extra-statutory “cohesiveness” requirement is a 
tempting place for class objectors to look for protections against 
majoritarian overreach.  But as we have discussed, cohesiveness is really 
just shorthand for manageability.  And hybrid cases like Eubanks v. 
Billington provide tempting bases on which to argue that courts may 
broadly allow opt-outs from (b)(2) classes.101  But those cases only ever 
allowed opt-outs to seek monetary relief—a doctrinal stream that has 
been fully dammed by Dukes.  Still, we should expect to hear these 
arguments from (b)(2) class members who complain that their interests 
are being ignored by class settlements.  And indeed, these arguments 
were front and center in the recent payment card cases, as we will discuss 
in Part III. 
Finally, what about the doctrinal developments under the adequate 
representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4)?  Doesn’t that robust body of 
law provide a basis for addressing warring class member preferences?  
Here again, the answer is no. 
In Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, the Court held that adequate 
representation was lacking where the class representatives, who had all 
been injured by exposure to asbestos, entered a settlement agreement that 
prejudiced the interests of future claimants, for whom asbestos-related 
injuries had not yet manifested.102  The conflict, according to the Court, 
was acute: “[f]or the currently injured, the critical goal is generous 
immediate payments.  That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-
only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the 
future.”103 
Following Amchem, the authors of the ALI’s Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litigation, termed these sorts of divergent interests—where 
proposed settlements shortchanged as-yet-uninjured claimants, who 
lacked separate representation—“structural conflicts.”104  The 
                                                          
 101.   110 F.3d at 94.  See also infra text accompanying notes 88–89. 
 102.   521 U.S. 591 (1997).  The conflicts in Amchem were significant.  Most prominently, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys were representatives of individuals claiming current injury, but because 
defendants would not settle without a guarantee against future claims, counsel “endeavored to 
represent the interests of the anticipated future claimants, although those lawyers then had no 
attorney-client relationship with such claimants.”  Id. at 601.  Further, the nine named plaintiffs all 
claimed existing injury, no subclasses were created, and the proposed settlement provided a payment 
schedule for different types of asbestos-related disease with no adjustment for inflation.  Finally, 
numerous claims—such as fear of future harm and medical monitoring, as well as all punitive 
damages—were released in the settlement.  Id. at 602–04. 
 103.   Id. at 626. 
 104.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, section 2.07(a)(1) (2010) (“(a) As 
necessary conditions to the aggregate treatment of related claims by way of a class action, the court 
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differences between the already-injured members’ interests and the 
interests of the future claimants are “structural,” in the sense that they are 
objectively determined; they are functions of how the class members are 
situated.  These differences arise from objective, ex ante-observable 
distinctions, and not from any idiosyncratic strategies or preferences.105  
Accordingly, post-Amchem courts faced with adequacy challenges seek 
to “ferret out” “whether there are ‘structural’ conflicts within a proposed 
class that make it improper for class counsel to represent them all.”106 
No doubt, the divide between structural conflicts, on the one hand, 
and conflicting preferences, on the other, is porous at the margin.107  One 
could argue that preferences themselves are the product of objectively 
determinable interests, as processed by experience.  But in practice, the 
distinction has not proven difficult for courts to apply.108  It does not 
appear, in fact, that the concept of “structural conflict” has strayed far 
beyond the paradigm of the future claimant.109  And even within the 
                                                          
shall (1) determine that there are no structural conflicts of interest.”).  See also Reporters’ Notes cmt. 
d (“The casting of subsection (a)(1) in terms of ‘structural conflicts of interest’ is designed to lend 
greater precision to the loyalty inquiry in connection with class actions, an inquiry historically 
phrased in terms of adequate representation.”). 
 105.   See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 631 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding Rule 
23(a)(4) demands adequate “structural protections to assure that differently situated plaintiffs 
negotiate for their own unique interests”); Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831–32 (1999) 
(reversing class certification on adequacy grounds where “the District Court took no steps at the 
outset to ensure that the potentially conflicting interests of easily identifiable categories of claimants 
be protected”); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(finding “the named representatives cannot ‘vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through 
qualified counsel’ because their interests are actually or potentially antagonistic to, or in conflict 
with, the interests and objectives of other class members”); Dewey v. Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189) 
(“A fundamental conflict exists where some [class] members claim to have been harmed by the same 
conduct that benefitted other members of the class.”). 
 106.   Alan B. Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process: Little Things Mean a 
Lot, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 428, 439–40 (2011); see also Steven D. Marcus, Note, Resegregation 
and Non-party Preclusion, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2118, 2137 (2015) (“After Amchem, the focus for 
those seeking to challenge class settlement shifted to ferreting out every possible conflict between 
class members.”); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“The adequacy requirement ‘is designed to ferret out’ such conflicts of interest ‘and to ensure that 
the putative named plaintiff has the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously.’”).   
 107.   See Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 430 (“‘Identity’ of interests is 
‘certainly’ not required.  But something stronger than ‘[s]hared interests’ is necessary in the event 
that a class representative’s interests only minimally overlap with class members’ interests.  The 
proper test lies between these two extremes.”) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 108.   See Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of 
Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1698–99, 1703 (2004) 
(arguing that, in practice, courts “routinely, reflexively, and presumptively certify proposed class 
counsel as adequate”). 
 109.   Cases addressing (a)(4) conflict outside the context of future claimants are sparse.  See, 
e.g., Williams v. City of Phila., 270 F.R.D. 208, 216 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (summarizing that in this prison 
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context of settlements that differentially affect future claimants, courts 
have generally declined to find (a)(4) conflicts from the fact that 
“representative plaintiffs derive less utility from protections for future 
claims than those who have only future claims.”110  In the absence of a 
disabling structural conflict, the fact that “not all members of the class 
may seek or desire the same relief, or may otherwise have disparate 
interests, will not render a class definition overly broad or defective or 
bar the certifying of a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory 
relief.”111 
So where does that leave us?  Our thesis is that the framers of Rule 
23, operating out of benevolent paternalism and unable to foresee the 
expansion of (b)(2) class action practice into the commercial realms, 
designed a mandatory class device that—it turns out—will tend to run 
roughshod over the interests of dissenting class members, unless the 
minority’s interests are themselves a function of structural, ex ante-
observable attributes.  Intra-class tensions arising from this regime have 
predictably been amplified by the growth of contemporary 
entrepreneurial class action practice.  High-stakes entrepreneurial cases 
with the capacity to produce structural reform bring the radical 
                                                          
conditions case, the defendant challenged adequacy on the grounds some inmates want to be 
transferred to less crowded facilities, while others “may wish to remain . . . to be close to friends and 
family”).  See also Samuel Issacharoff & Robert Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1187 n.48 (2009) (listing class action challenges grounded in adequacy that 
do not directly implicate the interests of current vs. future class members). 
 110.   Dewey, 681 F.3d 170, 186 (clarifying that “each class member naturally derives different 
amounts of utility from any class-wide settlement. An older . . . plaintiff, for example, might value a 
front-loaded settlement more than other members of the class. A coupon-clipping representative 
plaintiff may derive more utility from a coupon-based settlement than other members of the class. To 
hold that these differing valuations by themselves render the representative plaintiff inadequate 
would all but eviscerate the class action device”); Gooch, 672 F.3d at 428 (“[D]ifferently weighted 
interests” among class members “are not detrimental” to application for class certification “[b]ecause 
few people are ever identically situated;” indeed, “it is easy to paint an image of the class 
representative’s interests as peripherally antagonistic to the class. That depiction does not make the 
plaintiff an inadequate representative.”). 
 111.   Gooch, 672 F.3d at 429 (quoting NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 3.23); In re FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp. Practices Litig., 273 F.R.D. 424, 438 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (permitting 
a class-wide challenge to FedEx’s practice of selectively categorizing employees as “contractors,” 
despite the fact that some employees categorized as contractors might prefer that categorization due 
to the “favorable relationship” it allows them to cultivate with the company); Vaccarino v. Midland 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 3200500 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (“An unlawful charge is an 
unlawful charge,” which “could not [possibly] give rise to intra-class conflicts” even if some class 
members may have preferred to pay the charge for whatever reason.).  See also Samuel Issacharoff 
& Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1684 (2008) 
(noting that the differences in the class “that matter are those that give rise to a significant potential 
for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in some predictable way the design of 
class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the 
relevant claims”). 
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majoritarian design of Rule 23(b)(2) into particularly stark relief.  And 
no case better showcases these issues than the ongoing Payment Card 
Interchange litigation, which we discuss in Part III. 
III. THE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE CASE AND THE MANDATORY 
CLASS 
If Payment Card Interchange did not exist, a law professor would 
have had to create it as a stylized vehicle for exploring the issues 
surrounding the mandatory class action in cases featuring heterogeneous 
class member interests.  Among other areas, the case compels the 
observer to consider: (i) the limits of the adequacy of representation 
requirement; (ii) the application of the “cohesiveness” doctrine; (iii) the 
possibility of injunctive opt-out rights in injunctive cases; and (iv) the 
role of the Rule 23(e) fairness requirement in constraining the tyranny of 
the majority.  We will briefly address each after providing some 
background. 
A. Background 
In Payment Card Interchange, a putative class representing all U.S. 
credit-card-accepting merchants brought claims against the Visa and 
MasterCard networks and their top member banks, alleging the swipe 
fees that merchants incur each time they process a card transaction are 
inflated by defendants’ violations of the antitrust laws.  In particular, the 
merchants challenged several of Visa and MasterCard’s network rules.  
The first related to the rules under which the networks and their member 
banks centrally set the so-called “interchange rates” that determine the 
swipe fees each merchant pays.  In the lawsuit, the merchants attacked 
this “Interchange Rule” as collusive price fixing.112  Another claim 
challenged the “No Surcharge Rules”—the network rules that prevent 
merchants from passing along to their customers the swipe fees they 
incur—via a discrete surcharge levied on each transaction.113  And the 
lawsuit challenged other network rules as well, including the “Honor All 
Cards Rule,” which prohibits merchants from declining specific Visa or 
                                                          
 112.   Merchant Discount, 827 F.3d at 228 (“Plaintiffs allege that these Visa and MasterCard 
network rules, working in tandem, allow the issuing banks to impose an artificially inflated 
interchange fee that merchants have little choice but to accept.”). 
 113.   Id. at 229 (“The most consequential relief afforded the (b)(2) class was the ability to 
surcharge Visa- and MasterCard-branded credit cards at both the brand and product levels. That is, a 
merchant could increase the price of a good at the point of sale if a consumer presents (for example) 
a Visa card instead of cash, or a Visa rewards card instead of a Visa card that yields no rewards.”). 
1014 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
MasterCard-branded cards based on the identity of the issuing bank or 
other features.114 
After nearly a decade of litigation, the class and the defendants 
reached a settlement that provided for the richest payout ever in an 
antitrust class action—roughly $7.25 billion in cash.115  On the injunctive 
side, the deal provided for the rescission of the “No-Surcharge Rules,” 
but did not purport to alter the Interchange “Rules or the Honor All 
Cards Rules.”116  And the settlement contained broad release terms, 
under which merchants would release their claims under all three 
rules.117  The settlement provided for separate-but-overlapping classes 
under both Rule 23(b)(3), for damages, and (b)(2), a mandatory class for 
injunctive relief.  A merchant electing to opt out of the (b)(3) class to 
seek individual damages would still be bound to the terms of the (b)(2) 
release, and would of course still get the benefits of the injunctive 
relief.118 
The settlement was a controversial one.  Objecting merchants 
launched a nationwide “Stop The Settlement” campaign in industry and 
media channels.  In all, several thousand merchants, and many of the 
largest U.S. merchants, signed on to one or more of the filed objections, 
representing 19% of U.S. card transaction volume in the aggregate.119  
The objectors’ primary complaint was with the injunctive relief 
providing the ability to impose credit card surcharges.  For these class 
members, this injunctive relief was not sufficiently valuable to justify 
providing a broad release, under which the defendants would remain free 
to maintain their Interchange and Honor All Cards Rules.120  In short, the 
                                                          
 114.   Id. at 228 (“The argument is that the honor-all-cards rule forces merchants to accept all 
Visa and MasterCard credit cards (few merchants can afford to accept none of them).”). 
 115.   See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 
207, 213–14 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (approving settlement that provided for “[t]he creation of two cash 
funds totaling up to an estimated $7.25 billion (before reductions for opt-outs)”); see also Christie 
Smythe, Visa, MasterCard $7.25 Billion Fee Deal Wins Approval, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2012). 
 116.   Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 213–14 (approving injunctive settlement 
providing for “Visa and Mastercard rule modifications to permit merchants to surcharge on Visa- or 
MasterCard-branded credit card transactions at both the brand and product levels”). 
 117.   Payment Card Interchange, 827 F.3d at 230 (“[P]laintiffs are bound by a release that 
waives any claims they would have against the defendants for: all of the conduct challenged in the 
operative complaint, all other policies and practices (concerning credit card transactions) that were in 
place as of November 27, 2012, and any substantially similar practices they adopt in the future.”). 
 118.   Id. at 229 (“[M]embers of the first class (which receives money damages in the settlement) 
could opt out, but members of the second, forward-looking class (which receives only injunctive 
relief) could not.”). 
 119.   Payment Card Interchange, 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Brief on 
Behalf of Appellant 7-Eleven et al.,  12-4671 Doc. No. 983 at 18. 
 120.   The idea behind allowing merchants to impose surcharges to help cover the swipe fees 
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nub of the attack on the settlement was the warring preferences of class 
members. 
B. Adequacy of Representation 
In the Payment Card Interchange settlement, the district court 
approved a dual-class structure consisting of a (b)(3) damages class and a 
mandatory (b)(2) injunctive class, with one set of lawyers representing 
all class members.121  Dual-class structures of this sort have become 
commonplace in cases seeking both damages and injunctive relief—and 
for good reason.122  The only alternative is to have a unitary (b)(3) class 
for all claims,123 leaving class members free to opt out with their various 
idiosyncratic (and possibly conflicting) injunctive claims intact.124  Such 
a regime would all but preclude class actions seeking both damages and 
injunctive relief against a defendant’s across-the-board practices.125  The 
dual-class structure, meanwhile, gives parties the freedom to negotiate 
with many variables in play—including damages, injunctive terms, and 
the terms of releases.  Subject to the constraints of class counsel’s 
fiduciary obligations and the substantive fairness requirement of Rule 
23(e), the dual-class structure allows a defendant to condition the 
payment of money damages upon the receipt of an airtight release of 
future injunctive claims.  And, in theory, the dual-class structure allows 
for claims and elements of relief to be traded off against one another, 
including damages and injunctive elements—much the same way that a 
                                                          
they incur is that this will induce card networks to drop their interchange rates.  If a network’s rates 
are too high, in a world without no-surcharge rules, merchants are able to impose surcharges on that 
network’s cards, incentivizing cardholders to use other cards that are not surcharged at the point of 
sale.   
 121.   986 F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 122.   See, e.g., Ebert v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 480 (8th Cir. 2016) (describing dual-
classes as “an available approach that is gaining ground in class action suits”). 
 123.   Another alternative is to seek monetary damages under (b)(2)—but this option is no longer 
available n the wake of the Court’s decision in Wal-mart v. Dukes.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 94–97. 
 124.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1023 n.90 (“Indeed, courts have often granted injunctive relief in 
the context of Rule 23(b)(3) claims, at least when equitable and monetary damages are both sought. 
And when this occurs, opt-outs from the Rule 23(b)(3) class are free to seek individual injunctive 
relief.”). 
 125.   In fact, a dual-class structure is unavoidable—and a unitary (b)(3) is untenable—if various 
opt-outs might seek conflicting forms of injunctive relief against the defendant.  Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
provides for a mandatory class in cases where the different injunctions sought “would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct” for the defendant.  In practice, of course, (b)(2) prevents 
multiple potentially conflicting injunctions whether or not the defendant can meet the demanding 
“would establish incompatible standards of conduct” standard. 
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lawyer representing an individual client might trade off claims and 
elements of relief in settlement negotiations. 
The Second Circuit decision in Payment Card Interchange raises the 
question of whether this broad freedom to negotiate is a feature or a bug 
of the dual-class system.  To the court, it was reason enough to reverse 
the settlement that one set of lawyers represented both the damages class 
under (b)(3) and the injunctive (b)(2) class and so had incentives to trade 
off injunctive relief for damages.126  The membership of the two classes 
was largely overlapping—all operating merchants at the time of 
settlement had live claims for damages and injunctive relief—but the 
overlap was not total.127  The (b)(3) class included merchants who had 
gone out of business, and the (b)(2) class would bind merchants who do 
not yet exist—that is, future merchants would be bound by the release 
and would benefit from the injunction.128 
The Second Circuit was careful to base its (a)(4) analysis on 
structural considerations—namely, the structure of the dual-class 
approach itself.  The court was especially careful, in a legislative sort of 
way, to identify the conditions under which it will find a dual-class 
structure offends Rule 23(a)(4): “when the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes do 
not have independent counsel, seek distinct relief, have non-
overlapping membership, and (importantly) are certified as settlement-
only.”129  Of course, settlement-only certification is true in most class 
cases nowadays.130  So the Second Circuit test really comes down to 
whether there are any non-overlapping members.  If there are even a 
handful, the panel decision tells us, a structural conflict requires 
“structural protection”—specifically, division of the class into 
“homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate 
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”131 
                                                          
 126.   827 F.3d at 233 (“[T]he unitary representation of these plaintiffs was inadequate . . . . Such 
conflicts and absence of incentive required a sufficient ‘structural assurance of fair and adequate 
representation,’ but none was provided.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 127.   Id. at 235 (discussing the “partial overlap of merchants” belonging to both the (b)(2) and 
(b)(3) classes). 
 128.   Id. (predicting that “[o]ver time, the initial overlap will be reduced, and the gap between 
the interests of the (b)(3) and (b)(2) classes will continue to widen” as some merchants fail and 
others come into being). 
 129.   Id. 
 130.   See William B. Rubenstein, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:77 (West 5th ed. 2012 & 
Supp. 2016) (observing that a “stock device” is the settlement class action where “the parties may 
simultaneously submit to the court both a motion for class certification and a motion to approve a 
class action settlement.”).  See also Dukes, 565 U.S. 338 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 131.   827 F.3d at 231 (quoting Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856). 
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The merits or demerits of the Payment Card Interchange decision 
are not our focus here.132  The point, rather, is the treatment of 
heterogeneous preferences—an issue that the Second Circuit decision 
simply defers until it is presented by a structurally homogenous class.  
Instead of resolving any issues of warring class-member preferences, the 
panel decision just creates a new issue of warring subclass-member 
preferences.  Within the new subclass, the same issues will persist: some 
members will very much want the surcharging relief, while others will 
want to hold out for better or different terms, or just to hold on to their 
releases. 
Suppose that, in the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, a 
separately represented injunctive class were to seek approval of the same 
injunctive relief and release terms as before.  What would be the result?  
The decision suggests that the panel could find yet another structural 
conflict and, once again, require additional subclassing, and so on—as 
still-narrower subclasses present the same issues over and over.133  For 
example, the court was sympathetic to the objectors’ argument that many 
merchants cannot derive value from the surcharge relief, either because 
they are located in a state that bans credit-card surcharges by law, or 
because the merchant accepts American Express and is limited in its 
ability to surcharge under Amex rules: 
 
                                                          
 132.   That said, in our view, the Second Circuit’s ruling clearly suffers from a flawed reading of 
Amchem and Ortiz.  Those cases involved two sets of mutually exclusive and antagonistic claims.  
Every dollar that went from a limited asbestos fund to a presently-injured plaintiff was a dollar lost 
to a future claimant.  That zero-sum antagonism was the whole predicate for the rule of those cases.  
In Payment Card, by contrast, there is no zero-sum equation at all; there is no antagonism between 
the claims.  Indeed, all of the representative class plaintiffs have both claims.   
 133.   827 F.3d at 238 (“[A]ny merchant that operates in New York, California, or Texas (among 
other states that ban surcharging), or accepts American Express (whose network rules prohibit 
surcharging and include a most-favored nation clause) . . . [c]an get no advantage from the principal 
relief their counsel bargained for them.”).  This argument harkens back to an older approach, 
rejected by the 1966 framers, that no self-appointed representative could sue on behalf of a class of 
rights holders and obtain a preclusive judgment without class members opting in.  See, e.g., 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940) (“It is one thing to say that some members of a class may 
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the class in the 
litigation is either to assert a common right or to challenge an asserted obligation. [] It is quite 
another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are 
of a single class, so that any group merely because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed 
adequately to represent any others of the class in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a 
selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily 
or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that 
protection to absent parties which due process requires.”) (internal citations omitted).  We thank 
David Marcus for pointing this out. 
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[many] merchants in the (b)(2) class are either legally or commercially 
unable to obtain incremental benefit from the primary relief negotiated 
for them by their counsel . . . .  This is not a matter of certain merchants 
(e.g., those based in New York and those that accept American 
Express) arguing that class counsel did not bargain for their preferred 
form of relief . . . .134 
Does this suggest that, if the new (b)(2) subclass were to propose the 
same surcharging relief, the court would demand homogenous, 
separately represented subclasses comprised of merchants who operate in 
the states with no-surcharge statutes, or who accept American Express?  
It seems to.  And the result is a Russian matryoshka doll of an adequacy 
inquiry, with nested subclasses and sub-subclasses.  When a subclass 
presents warring preferences, the Second Circuit approach suggests the 
court (with the aid of objectors) might find some structural hook for 
narrowing the class, in an attempt to shoehorn the case into the mold of 
Ortiz and Amchem, where it can declare that “structural defects in this 
class action created a fundamental conflict.”135  But what if the real 
source of disharmony flows not from any structural differences at all?  
The objectors in Payment Card Interchange, after all, are not “unable” to 
benefit from the negotiated relief (e.g., because their business is limited 
to a state that bans surcharging).  They are national merchants—e.g., 
Home Depot, 7-Eleven, Target—who derive varying levels of utility 
from the negotiated relief based on a host of factors. 
The matryoshka model is ill suited for homogenizing the levels of 
utility that different class members can be expected to enjoy from a given 
set of negotiated reforms.  Even a subclass comprised of merchants with 
operations located solely in one of the states with no-surcharge laws 
could quite rationally favor the same deal terms allowing for credit-card 
surcharging.  After all, the state anti-surcharge statutes have been the 
ongoing subject of constitutional challenges for years—and were 
recently held likely unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 136  And in 
any event, the denizens of a nested subclass of merchants in a no-
                                                          
 134.   Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
 135.   827 F.3d at 236. 
 136.  Expressions Hair Design et al. v. Schneiderman, __ S. Ct. __ (March 29, 2017) (holding 
that the New York ban on credit card surcharges implicates commercial speech and remanding to the 
Second Circuit).  In the wake of Expressions, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Dana’s R.R. 
Supply v. Attorney Gen., Fla, 807 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015), thus solidifying the Eleventh 
Circuit’s determination that the Florida statute is unconstitutional.  The Court also remanded to the 
Fifth Circuit its decision in Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016) for reconsideration 
of the Texas statutory ban on credit-card surcharges (striking down Florida ban on credit-card 
surcharges).  Gary Friedman, co-author of this essay, initiated these merchant attacks on the state 
anti-surcharge statutes along with Gupta Wessler LLP. 
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surcharge state (if there are any left) might rationally expect that the 
threat of surcharging in the remaining forty-eight (or however many) 
states will cause the nationwide interchange rates to drop, thus benefiting 
even the merchants in the last remaining matryoshka doll.  And such a 
deal would especially make sense if counsel for the nested subclass 
shares the view that the consideration for the negotiated relief—namely, 
the release of certain other hypothetical claims (e.g., on the Honor All 
Cards and Interchange Rules) is a relatively trivial price to pay.137 
In the end, (a)(4) adequacy analysis merely shuffles the problem 
around, from a class level to a subclass level.  The same merchants are 
likely to have the same substantive objections to the same deal, down the 
road.  If we are looking at ways to address those objections, we must 
look elsewhere. 
C. The Cohesiveness Requirement 
In Payment Card Interchange the objectors argued that “the far-flung 
mandatory (b)(2) class lacked sufficient cohesion” because the injunctive 
relief in the settlement “had different value to different class 
members.”138  They complained that settlement has “bound together, in a 
mandatory (b)(2) class, millions of diverse merchants with conflicting 
interests in both the one claim on which they were granted relief [i.e., the 
surcharging claim] and the vastly broader collection of claims that the 
settlement resolved.”139  In short, they argued, “[i]f individual class 
members would want to litigate and redress their claims in different ways 
[] then those claims are not suitable for (b)(2) treatment.”140 
But as Professor Marcus’s historical work makes clear, (b)(2) has 
always accommodated diverse plaintiffs with conflicting interests who 
might wish to litigate and redress their claims in different ways.141  That 
was the innovation of (b)(2) and its improvement upon the state of the art 
under equity practice, where complete harmony of interests was required.  
As we discussed above, the cohesiveness requirement that courts have 
                                                          
 137.   827 F.3d at 238 (“It may be argued that the claims of the (b)(2) class are weak and can 
command no benefit in settlement.”). 
 138.   Merchant Appellant’s Joint Brief at 21, 24, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. 
Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-4671), 2014 WL 7335990. 
 139.   Id. at 46. 
 140.   Id. at 49. 
 141.   Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1 at 710 (observing that “the effective vindication of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights required systemic integration, or the treatment of black students as 
groups regardless of their individual preferences”).   
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located in Rule 23(b)(2) is nothing more than a stand-in for the 
manageability and superiority requirements that are explicit in (b)(3). 
In the end, there is clearly no warrant for implying a requirement 
under (b)(2) that class member interests be homogenous or identical.  
Instead, courts have recognized that “each class member naturally 
derives different amounts of utility from any class-wide settlement”142 
and “differently weighted interests are not detrimental” to class 
certification “[b]ecause few people are ever identically situated.”143 
If there is a doctrinal constraint on heterogeneous class member 
preferences, we must keep looking. 
D. Rule 23(e)’s Fairness Inquiry 
To whatever extent, there is at least some check against majoritarian 
overreach in the requirement of Rule 23(e)(2) that any settlement must 
be found “fair, reasonable, and adequate” if it purports to bind class 
members.144  In fact, courts look at the “reaction of the class to the 
settlement” as a key factor in their tests for assessing whether (e)(2) has 
been met.145  But the standard for finding favorable class member 
reaction under (e)(2) is easily met.  The Second Circuit, for instance, has 
held “that an otherwise fair settlement should not be deemed unfair 
because of opposition by thirty-six percent of the total class.”146  
Moreover, Rule 23(e) only applies to settlements, not trials.  A settlement 
with deeply unpopular terms can be rejected, under (e)(2), and class 
members will then be free to pursue alternative, preferred remedies.  But 
those same deeply unpopular terms may be obtained at trial, where (e)(2) 
has no application, and the class members will then be barred from 
pursuing their preferred alternative actions as a matter of res judicata. 
                                                          
 142.   Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 186 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 143.   Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 429 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 144.   Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 145.   Id.  (citing to the factors announced in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d 
Cir. 1974)).  Other circuits apply similar multi-factor tests, or follow Grinnell itself.  Molski v. 
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Grinnell factors); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 
F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 
216 F.R.D. 197, 206–07 (D. Me. 2003) (district courts in First Circuit apply Grinnell factors). 
 146.   In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(following “Second Circuit[‘s] . . . guidance as to what percentage of the class must object before a 
settlement would be rendered unfair . . .”) (citing Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 24 
(2d Cir. 1987) (“We perceive no reason why a settlement cannot be considered fair despite 
opposition from . . . significantly less than half of the class.”)). 
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In Payment Card Interchange, the Second Circuit could have—and 
frankly, should have—analyzed the relative values of the injunctive relief 
and the (b)(2) release under the rubric of Rule 23(e), and not under 
23(a)(4).  Rule 23(e) calls for a merits review, with facts on the table.  
The analysis under (a)(4) is entirely different: an ex ante inquiry to see if, 
based on the structural positioning of the parties and counsel, conflict is 
likely.  It is an odd heuristic to apply a formal ex ante lens when real-
world information is available.  The Second Circuit, in essence, held that 
it was unacceptably likely that unitary counsel could have traded 
injunctive relief for money to the detriment of class members.  But the 
relevant question should have been whether there was any detrimental 
trade-off in the real world.  Rule 23(e) cuts through the formalism and 
examines the actual deal.  Substantive evaluation of the value of the 
release under 23(e) would have required some analysis of the claims 
being released.  Implicit in the panel opinion is that there was value in 
the released claims.  A Rule 23(e) inquiry, by contrast, would not turn on 
bald presumptions.  If a deal is fair and adequate, it will be approved 
under Rule 23(e).  If not, then it will not. 
E. 23(b)(2) Opt-Outs 
Another potential check against majoritarian overreach is opt-out 
rights.  In the Payment Card Interchange case, Judge Jacobs’s panel 
decision swept aside the opt-out question, clarifying that  “[w]e do not 
decide whether providing [(b)(2)] class members with opt-out rights 
would be a sufficient ‘structural assurance of fair and adequate 
representation’ . . . to overcome the lack of separate class counsel and 
representative.”147  Presumably, though, opt-out rights would obviate any 
concern about the settlement that an objector might have.148  A different 
question is whether the court may allow opt-outs under (b)(2). 
Courts have only ever allowed opt-outs under (b)(2) in the context of 
“hybrid” cases seeking nominally equitable forms of monetary relief—a 
line of case law that was emphatically overruled in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes.149  Whether courts possess discretion to allow opt-outs in 
                                                          
 147.   827 F.3d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). 
 148.   After all, the opt-out right obviates the due process objections in damages cases under 
Shutts.  It is hard to see how an objecting plaintiff would be injured if it were given the ability to 
assert its own injunctive claims in an opt-out action, or to simply retain the right to sue and not be 
bound by the (b)(2) release.   
 149.   See text accompanying notes 94–97.  Note, in Wal-mart itself, the Court observed that 
(b)(2) “provides no opportunity for . . . class members to opt out . . .”  564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011).. 
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injunctive class actions post-Dukes is an open question.150  Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in that case observed “(b)(2) does not require 
that class members be given . . . opt-out rights, presumably because it is 
thought (rightly or wrongly) . . . that depriving people of their right to 
sue in [a mandatory class] complies with the Due Process Clause.”151  
Still, a court could presumably allow for opt-outs if the settling parties 
agreed.152  And there is authority—albeit arising in a limited fund case 
under (b)(1)—for allowing an opt-out from an otherwise mandatory class 
action in exceptional circumstances under the catchall authority provided 
in Rule 23(d)(1)(E).153 
In any event, if courts can direct opt-outs under (b)(2), it seems 
obvious that the injunctive opt-out right should be limited to cases where 
the bid for individual injunctive relief would be compatible with the class 
relief.154  Where the would-be opt-out relief would thwart the class relief 
in practical effect—where individual litigations would “substantially 
impair or impede” the “ability” of the “other members not parties to the 
individual adjudications” “to protect their interests”—Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
would bar opt-outs by its terms.  Still, where this compatibility test is 
met, allowing for carefully circumscribed injunctive opt-out rights may, 
in some cases, provide a valve to alleviate the intra-class pressure created 
by conflicting remedial preferences.  In the case of 1720, where objectors 
argued only that injunctive relief was insufficient consideration for a 
                                                          
 150.   McReynolds v Richards-Cantave, 588 F3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009) (allowing a Rule 
23(b)(2) plaintiff who objected to the settlement to opt out, stating that “[t]he right of a class member 
to opt-out in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions is not obvious on the face of the rule; however, ‘the 
language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-out rights 
in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions’”) (quoting Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
 151.   564 U.S. at 363. 
 152.   See, e.g., Newberg, supra note 130 at § 4:36 (observing that while opt-outs are not 
required in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, “they are discretionary, may be permitted, and have been 
employed”). 
 153.   Rule 23(d)(1)(E) endows district courts with discretion to “issue orders that . . . deal with 
similar procedural matters.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(E). This discretion is meant to facilitate “the 
fair and efficient conduct of the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 
Amendments.  See also County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 
1990).  In that limited fund case, the court allowed Suffolk County to opt out and seek full recovery 
because, unlike the other plaintiffs and “at great expense, Suffolk litigated its claims and obtained a 
jury verdict in its favor” and, further, “permitting Suffolk to opt out,” would not “substantially 
impair or impede the class members’ ability to protect their interests.”  (Brackets omitted) (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B)). 
 154.   See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to 
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 652 (2015) (suggesting that “the determination of whether opt-out 
rights are required should turn . . . on the relationship between the individual claims of absent class 
members and the scope of the defendant’s remedial obligation” rather than on a “sharp distinction 
between equitable claims and monetary claims”). 
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broad release—and not that any objector had individual injunctive claims 
it wished to pursue on its own—the compatibility rationale for injunctive 
opt-outs is lacking.155 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Among the questions raised by mandatory class actions seeking 
consequential injunctive relief is how to account for divergent 
preferences and agendas among the various members of the represented 
class.  Virtually all significant injunctive-relief class actions will feature 
some measure of heterogeneity in the goals and agendas of the 
constituent class members.  Do we simply steamroll over these 
oppositional viewpoints in order to achieve a settlement in service of the 
greater good—as the framers of the 1966 Rule appear to have 
contemplated in the narrow context of civil rights cases?  Or do we try to 
determine just how much heterogeneity due process can comfortably 
accommodate within a mandatory, non-opt-out class?  If we decide to 
engage in the latter exercise, what analytic tools should we employ—
Rule 23 (a)(4) adequacy, principles of “cohesion,” Rule 23(e) fairness 
factors?  Or perhaps we should sanction limited injunctive opt-outs—
allowing those who do not wish to be bound by a settlement to state their 
intent to seek individual relief or “vindicate a real interest” that is 
separate from but “consistent with the class relief”?156  Fifty years after 
the amendments to 1966, these questions—so fundamental to the fair 
operation of Rule 23(b)(2)—remain unanswered. 
 
                                                          
 155.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1025 n.96. 
 156.   Gilles, supra note 2, at 1026. 
